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never be capable of leaving Russia. One can understand why the Rus-
sia Miss Stalin confronts, the Russia which she claims that her father
always loved, was an abstract mystical entity; privilege and wealth have
always separated her from social reality. The most characteristic Soviet
experience is to stand in a queue for bread; this does not seem to be a
thought that Miss Stalin has ever had. It would be too prosaic for her.
There remains one aspect of her book which is of real value. She
does reveal in how impossible a position we put the children of major
figures. They lead private and not public lives, but their private lives
are distorted by the way in which they are exposed to the public gaze.
Of Stalin's children one became a drunkard and one has now written
memoirs; but one became a hero. Yakov, the son of Stalin's first mar-
riage, who was largely disowned by his father seems to have been, and
not only from this account, a straightforwardly moral and finally
heroic figure who defied the Germans in his prison camp and was
murdered by them. Miss Stalin when speaking on the power of Truth
and Goodness to survive falls victim to her own rhetoric; on her half-
brother's simple nobility of character she sounds more truthful than at
any other point in her unattractive book.
AASDAMR MACINTYRXt
Waters and Water Rights: A Treatise on the Law of
Waters and Allied Problems. (Robert Emmet Clark, ed.).
Indianapolis: Allen Smith, 1967. Pp. 1640 (3 vols.).
$28.50 each.
This work now consists of three volumes, with more promised; there
are eleven contributors plus an editor-in-chief. It thus adds another
title to a slowly growing list of multi-volume, multiple-author treatises
such as the American Law of Property and the American Law of Min-
ing. The idea behind the genre is that a number of writers, each ex-
pert in the branch of the subject with which he deals, can produce a
more comprehensive, better-thought-out treatment of a subject than
could a single author. The idea has merit, for the growth in the com-
plexity of the law has rendered many subjects beyond the capacity of
a single author to master and to explicate, especially if he is expected
t Professor of sociology, University of Essex.
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to deal with the related learning of such other disciplines as eco-
nomics, political science, statistics, or psychiatry.
Water law is a subject that lends itself to the multiple-author ap-
proach. A comprehensive text on the subject should treat administra-
tive law (both state and federal), local government law, constitutional
law, federal jurisdiction, international law, state and local tax law, tort
law, property law, condemnation law-as well as such traditional
water law questions as riparian rights, appropriation, the permit sys-
tem, transfer and termination of water rights, pollution, and so on.
The legal analysis of these topics should be informed by some knowl-
edge of ground water geology, hydrology, welfare economics, history,
and politics. Few men, even in a lifetime, can learn it all, much less set
out this learning in a comprehensive and comprehensible textbook.
There are, however, grave risks in the team approach to a legal
treatise. There must be an editor-in-chief who plans the work so that
the subject is fully covered, without omission or overlap. But even a
good plan won't produce a good book unless the editor-in-chief can
cajole or coerce the authors to abide by the plan. Since law professors
-and other legal experts-are not accustomed to team discipline, the
editor-in-chief faces a formidable challenge.
The editor of this book, Professor Robert E. Clark, of the University
of Arizona Law School, did not overcome these obstacles and thus
produced a book sorely lacking the unity and coherence that character-
izes the better works of solitary authors. I do not know whether the
trouble stems from the plan itself or from its execution by the con-
tributors. In either event, the ultimate responsibility rests with the
editor, for only he can impose order on the product.
To be blunt, this work is not a treatise at all; it is a collection of in-
dividual papers, of varying quality, dealing with assorted problems of
water law. Taken as a whole, the three volumes are repetitious, incon-
sistent, and episodic. Most of the authors apparently did not see the
writings of their colleagues, and the editor provided little coordination
between chapters. Gross-referencing between chapters is minimal, and
the content of one chapter seems to have had little influence on the
scope and thinking of other chapters. There is, moreover, little ap-
parent logic in the arrangement of the chapters, suggesting to the
cynic that they appear in the order in which they were turned in. Since
I am reviewing a book more appropriately entitled "Selected Essays
on Water Law," my job seems to be that of reporting on the several
essays as isolated pieces of work, just as they appear in the collection.
Most of the better essays are found in Volume Two, a circumstance
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I do not attribute to any organizing principle. Professor Sax of the
Michigan Law School has in Chapter 8 of this volume made a valuable
contribution to a difficult and diffuse subject, the law of reclamation.
Reclamation is not easy to write about because the law is largely found
in widely scattered, ambiguous, and inconsistent statutes, in Bureau of
Reclamation contracts and practices, and in opinions of the Solicitor
of the Interior Department, rather than in case law. Sax brings order
to this jumble, beginning sensibly with a brief history of reclamation
and working his way through the big and little problems of initiating,
authorizing, financing, and constructing a project, the acquisition of
water rights for the project, the delivery of water to the farmers, the
farmers' water rights and their repayment obligations, and the 160-
acre limitation. In the whole and in each section, the writing is a
model of organization and clarity. Only occasionally does the author
stumble over a rough place, as in his discussion of conservationists'
standing to oppose dam-licensing by the FPC,1 and even here the rele-
vant cases are cited. Elsewhere2 Sax discusses the public notice require-
ment for commencing a project but fails to talk about another pre-
requisite of commencement, confirmation proceedings on the contract
between the Bureau and the irrigation district. Such lapses are few and
are more than compensated for by the overall excellence of the chap-
ter. For example, Section 116.1 explores the unfamiliar question
whether the Secretary of the Interior can transform reserved land of
the United States (reserved, say, for forest purposes) into a reclamation
project. Not an earthshaking question, perhaps, but the discussion is a
model of careful, thoughtful, and thorough scholarship, in which a
mess of statutory materials is sorted out, the issues set forth, and per-
suasive conclusions presented-on a point, so far as I know, not previ-
ously discussed in print.
Professor Sax has opinions without being opinionated and his views
permeate his essay. I have no difficulty with the proposition that a
treatise (and a fortiori a collection of essays) is an appropriate place for
a legal scholar to set forth his notions on policy. Occasionally, how-
ever, Professor Sax embraces a policy position without clearly stating
either the position or his reasons for supporting it. His discussion of
the 160-acre limitation suffers from this fault. Section 5 of the original
Reclamation Act of 1902 limits the sale of project water to parcels of
1. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 113.3 (R.E. Clark ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as
WATER RIGHTS].
2. Id. § 114.
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160-acres or less. Owners of more land may retain this excess land but
can get no project water for it, or (as the rules developed) can grant the
Bureau power of sale over the excess lands and thereby receive project
water until a sale is consummated. Professor Sax is a great believer in
the 160-acre limitation, and he enveighs against its evasion with a fer-
vor reminiscent of an earlier prophet, Paul Taylor, whose first jere-
miad appeared in the pages of this journal over ten years ago.a
Just why Sax is so devoted to the policy is harder to discover. A
simple and perhaps acceptable explanation is that Congress enacted it,
and therefore administrators should enforce it. But Sax never says this,
and such a rationale might cause him some embarrassment, inasmuch
as he seems to lack the same warm regard for Section 8 of the 1902 Act,
which directs the Secretary of Interior to "proceed in conformity with
... [state] laws" which relate "to the control, appropriation, use, or
distribution of water used in irrigation."4 It is more likely the case
that Professor Sax approves the 160-acre limitation because he thinks
it is a good thing for society. Just why it is a good thing he does not
make clear. He says the original purpose was to prevent land monop-
oly and speculation-which may be, but are not necessarily, related
phenomena. Perhaps Sax embraces the Jeffersonian ideal of a demo-
cratic society based on the sturdy, independent yeoman tilling the (ir-
rigated) earth. The evidence rather supports the latter explanation,
for Sax contends that no project water should be delivered to any farm
unless it is owner-occupied and owner-operated.5
Ironically, experience indicates that in some instances at least a
rule of owner occupation would do little to promote the policy of the
160-acre limitation. For example, in attempting to sell excess lands of
the DiGiorgio Company in the Central Valley of California, the Bu-
reau first adopted a regulation forbidding sale to any person whose
purchase of the DiGiorgio lands would cause his total holdings of land
irrigated by reclamation water, anywhere in the country, to exceed
160 acres. Buyers could not be found, and consequently DiGiorgio
went on operating its 4700 acres. Later, the regulations were modified
to allow owners of 160 acres in other projects to buy and obtain water
for another 160 acres in the district where the DiGiorgio land lies, and
after five years of effort and further removal of restrictions on buyers,
the Bureau has been able to sell about three-quarters of the land.0 If
3. Taylor, The Excess Land Law: Execution of a Public Policy, 64 Y= L.J. 477 (1955).
4. 43 US.C. § 38 (1964).
5. 2 WATER RIGrs § 121.
6. Hudnall, Acreage Limitation in the Central Valley 24-27 (1967) (unpublished paper
prepared for the course in Water Law, Stanford Law School).
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the bidding was cool when farmers in other reclamation districts were
excluded from the market, it is not likely to get warmer when they and
other purchasers are told that they must occupy and operate the new
property in order to bid on it.
My complaint with Sax's work on the acreage limitation question is
that he leaves at large the justification for the rule, giving the reader
no basis for judging the validity of his conclusions, much less affording
the reader an opportunity to form his own views. If Sax's argument is
that the nation that farms together stays together, I am a little skep-
tical of its validity in the latter half of the 20th century. Even if it were
true that the family farm makes for a better society, I doubt that the
160-acre limitation is a sufficiently powerful weapon to stop the move-
ment toward large, corporate farms operated by hired labor and owned
by absentee capitalists. If a 640-acre farm in the Central Valley of Cal-
ifornia will have a net revenue of $19,500, but a 160-acre farm a net
revenue of only $2,750, 7 inexorable economic pressure will in time
foreclose on the old family homestead.
The real problem, as I see it, is what Sax usually calls speculation,
what I would call subsidy, and what Congressmen call pork barrel.
Under the reclamation program, water is sold to farmers at prices far
below actual cost. The subsidy is openly granted through interest-free
loans for periods of fifty years and up, and through maintenance work
(such as channelization) performed without charge to the beneficiaries.
It is covertly given, many people think, by overcharging hydroelectric
power customers and by assigning large portions of the costs of projects
to non-reimbursable items such as navigation, flood control and recre-
ation, where the benefits do not justify the write-off. If the 160-acre
limitation has a contemporary raison d'etre, it is the spreading of these
subsidies over a larger group by dividing the land into smaller parcels.
While the policy may keep the rich from getting richer, it can hardly
be characterized as an act for the relief of the poor, when one realizes,
for example, that one of the 160-acre parcels offered for sale upon the
breakup of the DiGiorgio estate was priced at $294,500 8-a price
fixed upon a valuation of the land without project water. The new
owner would, of course, get the cheap water and his sales price would
presumably increase to reflect the subsidy. Rather than trying to
7. Rummel, Agrarian Reform Through Federal Limitation of Water, LEGAL StarNo,
AMEICAN LIFE CONVENTION, PROCEEDINGS 40, 45 (1965).
8. Hudnall, supra note 6, at 24. The cheapest parcel on the block at the first sale was
a 40 acre parcel priced at $64,300. At this sale, only one parcel in fact sold, a 67-acre lot
which went for $108,000. See also Rummel, supra note 7, at 48.
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spread the subsidy among a larger number of quite prosperous farmers
at the expense of farming efficiency, I would suggest that we face the
fact that the 160-acre limitation doesn't really work, and consider
abolishing it and pricing water at its real cost.
It may be that subliminal notions of policy also lead Professor Sax
to the extreme propositions of Section 117.1. In the general context of
acquisition of water rights for reclamation projects, he has occasion to
discuss the reservation doctrine, the roots of which go back to Winters
v. United States9 in 1908, but the flowering of which occurred in 1963
in Arizona v. California."0 In brief, the reservation doctrine holds that
when the United States withdraws land from the public domain so
that it is no longer open to entry under one or another of the land
grant acts, there may be reserved from any stream within or bounding
the reserved land sufficient water to accomplish the purposes of the
reservation. In appropriation states, at least, the water right thus re-
served has a priority dating from the time of the withdrawal. The
right is thus superior to all subsequently initiated state-created water
rights (even if the federal right has never been exercised), although it
is inferior to state-created rights arising before the withdrawal. There
is a good deal of uncertainty about the doctrine: (1) does every with-
drawal reserve some water or must an intent to reserve water be mani-
fest? (2) how much water is reserved by a withdrawal and by what cri-
teria is the quantity determined?
Professor Sax sees little difficulty in these questions. Specifically, he
sees "just a small step" from present doctrine to the proposition that
withdrawal of a damsite reserves enough water to fill the reservoir." I
see two serious objections to this view. First, Winters v. United States
and Arizona v. California hold that the creation of Indian reservations
pursuant to treaty or statute was intended to reserve sufficient water
to enable the Indians to accomplish the purposes thereof, namely, the
cultivation of the land. It does not follow that the reservation of power
sites under different statutes was intended to reserve enough water to
fill the reservoir, whenever (if ever) a dam should be bult. Certainly
the two most important statutes of general application to dam-build-
ing on reserved lands look to the preservation of state-created rights
vesting prior to commencement of the federal project: Section 27 of
the Federal Water Power Act,'- governing FPC licensing on reserved
9. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
10. 573 U.S. 546 (1963), decree entered, 376 U.S. 340 (1964).
11. 2 WVATER RiGTs § 117.1.
12. 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1964).
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lands, provides for the protection of vested rights as does Section 813 of
the Reclamation Act, applicable to all reclamation projects. Sax fails to
deal with the differences between statutes creating Indian reservations
and statutes relating to damsite withdrawals and reservoir construc-
tion.
Second, whatever merit there may be in the legal theory supporting
the reservation doctrine in general, there are strong policy considera-
tions that argue against extending the doctrine to the right to fill a
federal reservoir and thereby displace existing uses in favor of new
uses generated by the project. For example, if Professor Sax's theory
were applied to Hoover Dam, and if the damsite had been reserved
before irrigation commenced on the Colorado River, the entire water
supply of the Imperial Valley's 500,000 acres of prime, cultivated land
would be available for redistribution to new users. The consequences
to the old users are serious enough: destruction of capital values, dis-
ruption of existing economies, and drastic frustration of expectations.
Sax's reliance on Berman v. Parker14 to rebut the accusation of unjus-
tified injury to private expectations is misplaced: in Berman v. Parker,
the property owners got paid; under the reservation doctrine they will
not.
But in addition to the havoc that would be inflicted on prior users
by the extension of the reservation doctrine to damsite withdrawals,
there is the fact that capital investment in water resource development
will be deterred.15 The moment Professor Sax's theory is adopted by a
13. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1964).
14. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
15. The magnitude of the potential effects of such an extension, both in deterring In-
vestment and in upsetting expectations, can be seen in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963). There five Indian Reservations in the Lower Colorado River Basin were awarded
one million acre-feet of water per year, or about 15 per cent of the Lower Basin supply.
Of this million about 200,000 acre-feet had been put to use at the time of trial, although
some of the withdrawals dated back to 1865, and the ,rights they reserved thus had first
priority on the lower river. See Master's Report, Arizona v. California 127, 350-52 (1960).
If the full one million acre-feet is put to use on the reservations, Los Angeles is likely to
receive no water from the Colorado River, although it has spent $500 million on an aque-
duct to import 1.3 million acre-feet per year. If, on the other hand, Arizona v. California
had been decided before the construction of the aqueduct, the city would assuredly never
have built it; as a result, 800,000 acre-feet of water would have been withdrawn from use
until Congress appropriated funds to enable the Indians to use it. This might well
have been a long time, since there aren't very many Indians on the reservations, and
on at least one there are none at all.
The enormous impact of the reservation doctrine, even if it be confined to Indian
reservations and a few other federal establishments, will be more fully understood when
it is realized that Arizona v. California adjudicated only a fraction of the reservations in
the Lower Basin-those lying on the mainstream. Yet to be determined are the water
rights of the numerous reservations on tributaries, one of which-the Navajo-claims 16
million acres. Since the standard adopted in Arizona v. California for measuring Indian
rights is the amount of water required to irrigate all irrigable acreage, the collision be.
tween Indian rights and state-created rights now in use will be jarring, to say the least,
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court, all further private and public investment in water projects will
stop on all streams on which federal damsite withdrawals have been
made. All investment, that is, except investment by the Federal Gov-
ernment itself. And this is what I meant by suggesting that subliminal
notions of policy have influenced Professor Sax's legal analysis. It may
be true that the Federal Government is the appropriate institution to
develop our water resources. But we should decide that question by
examining it, not by extending the reservation doctrine.
Another good essay in Volume Two is Chapter 7, in which Professor
Morreale of Rutgers discusses federal powers over water and the inter-
action between the states and the Federal Government in regard to
water development programs. The first half of the chapter is a revision
of Mrs. Morreale's definitive article on the navigation power and the
no-compensation rule.'0 The revision gains through condensation
without loss of clarity or analytical detail.
The second half of the chapter is less successful. Here she deals with
other constitutional powers of the Federal Government bearing on
water rights and water development. This discussion is devoted prin-
cipally to the property clause of Article IV, which grants Congress
power "to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations re-
specting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States." The exercise of the property power has played an important
part in the development of the water law of the West, where the Uni-
ted States was the original proprietor of most of the land by virtue of
its acquisition through purchase or conquest. The chapter concludes
with an examination of various legislative proposals for the adjust-
ment of the relations between the two levels of government.
Professor Morreale's treatment of the property power is competent
but less probing than it might be. A formidable challenge, not fully
met, is to fit together the Acts of 1866,17 1870,18 and 1877,10 California
Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.20 and FPC v. Ore-
gon.2' At root is the structural question of the source of the law gov-
erning water rights in the Western states. We know from the Califor-
nia Oregon case that the three acts cited gave great latitude to the
operation of state law; we also know from FPC v. Oregon (as well as
16. Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule
of No Compensation, 3 NATuRAL REso URCEs J. 1 (1963).
17. 14 Stat. 253 (1867), 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1 64).
18. 16 Stat. 218 (1870), 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1964).
19. The Desert Land Act, 19 Stat. 377 (1877), as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 321 et seq. (1964).
20. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
21. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
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from Arizona v. California2) that there are limits to the operation of
state law. Professor Morreale would have been more sensitive to these
intricacies had she discovered United States v. Hunter,23 decided by a
federal district court in 1964 (and reversed by the Ninth Circuit in
1967 after the chapter was in print24). Some attention to the Hunter
case and somewhat closer attention to the Worswick case25 would have
shifted her emphasis in Section 102.4(C) backward from the Desert
Land Act of 1877 to the Act of 1866, which in California, at least, is
the critical legislation.
When Professor Morreale comes to an evaluation of the continued
vitality of state law in water resource development, 20 her understand-
able distaste for the overreaching of the Western proponents of water
rights settlement legislation2 7 seems to have blinded her to some of the
genuine concerns about state-federal relations. In discussing the effect
of federal legislation on the power of states to exercise a measure of
control over federally financed projects, she makes this bizarre state-
ment:
There is, of course, no dispute that these enactments do have lan-
guage indicating some concern for state control over water re-
sources. But quaere, how many of these provisions were merely
"boiler plates" inserted to assure passage. Even if they were true
policy preferences, they did no more than subject certain projects
and certain administrative functions to state control.28
I should have supposed that even plain vanilla "boiler plate" has some
purpose, and that" 'boiler plates' inserted to assure passage" are more
purposeful than mere boiler plate. As to the last sentence quoted, I
don't know how the reader is to judge Professor Morreale's assertion,
since the "enactments" and "provisions" in question are never speci-
fied.20 Statutory donstruction is hard enough when the text and the
22. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
23. 236 F. Supp. 178 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
24. -F.2d - (9th Cir. 1967).
25. San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Worswick, 187 Cal, 674, 203 P.
999 (1922).
26. 2 WATR RiGSs § 102.7.
27. See id. §§ 107 et seq.
28. Id. § 102.7, at 78.
29. The only specific reference given to identify "these enactments" and "these provi-
sions" is Hearings on the Water Rights Settlement Act, Before Subcommittee on Irrigation
and Reclamation, Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 84th Cong., 2d Sem. 59
(1956). This is a statement by Senator Hruska of Nebraska, which cites no federal statutes
at all, the only specific citation being to a provision of the Nebraska Constitution. Later
in the text, Professor Morreale does identify at least some of the federal acts in questiont
Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1964), Sections 9(b) and 27 of
the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, 16 U.S.C. §§ 802(b), 821 (1964), and Section 18 of the
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legislative history is before you; it is impossible when the statute to be
construed is not even identified. Apparently, Professor Morreale has
suspended her critical faculties in response to the equally uncritical
contentions of the proponents of the water rights settlement bills.
There are three other chapters in Volume Two. Chapter 9, on in-
terstate streams, is an excellent essay by Professor Corker of the Uni-
versity of Washington, reflecting both the author's extensive experi-
ence in interstate stream litigation and his superb legal scholarship.20
Chapter 11, by Professor Utton of New Mexico, deals successfully with
the international law of streams, although it could have been im-
proved by tying the treatment of the Mexican and Canadian water
treaties closer to the earlier discussion of equitable apportionment
and basin development. Also neglected was the opportunity to use the
treaties to illustrate problems of drafting and interpretation, as might
have been done with the Mexican Treaty in Section 152.2(C), which
discusses the Colorado River salinity problem.3a
Chapter 10, on Indian water rights, is adequate but not up to the
standards of the preceding four chapters. It also demonstrates the or-
ganizational weakness of the treatise, and the inability or unwilling-
Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 43 U.S.C. § 617q (1964). In the two pages devoted
to the interpretation of these statutes, she accepts uncritically the conclusions of othrs,
making no effort at an independent analysis of her own. It is not enough to knock over
the straw man "that federal legislation has ... in the past worked a transfer of all federal
interests in western water to the states." 2 WIATER RIGHT'S § 102.8, at 81. The question is,
what is the proper accommodation between the two governments under statutes that seem
to recognize the continued validity of state law.
80. I wish that Professor Corker had found the space to take up some of the troubling
implications of Hinderlider v. La Plata & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 801 US. 92 (1938).
wherein Mr. Justice Brandeis upheld the validity of an interstate compact against the
claim of an appropriator that it infringed on his vested rights. Under state law, the
appropriator had a call on the river whenever he desired vater (subject to the claims of
any prior appropriators); under the compact, the stream was rotated between the two
states on a ten-day basis. Thus during the ten days the stream belonged to the other state,
the appropriator was deprived of his right to use water. Mr. Justice Brandeis held that
all state-created water rights are subject to the limitation of the equitable apportionment
doctrine, according to which some of the water originating in one state may belong to
another state. Brandeis further held that a compact was as appropriate an instrument
for invoking the principle as an adjudication by the Court. But does it follow that local
priorities may be upset, without just compensation, by an interstate compact? If in State
One, A, B, and C have appropriative rights in that order of priority, could an interstate
compact invoking the doctrine of equitable apportionment reorder the priorities C, B,
and A? Could a compact make an equitable apportionment by giving all the water in the
Blue River to State One and all of the water of the Green River to State Two, thus ex-
propriating the water rights of users of the Green in State One?
31. The Mexican Water Treaty of 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994 (19G4). The con-
struction question arises over the phrase "from any and all sources" in Article 10 of the
Treaty and the phrase "whatever their origin" in Article 11, both of which relate to
the allocation of water to Mexico. Although the United States has managed to achieve a
physical solution to the immediate problem of the quality of water delivered to Mexico,
the long range prospects are not good, for full development of the river will increase its
salinity at the border and physical solutions will not suffice.
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ness of the editor to mold his material into an integrated whole. There
is little excuse for a separate chapter on Indian water rights, for the
subject is merely a branch (or perhaps the trunk) of the reservation
doctrine. Yet Indian rights are treated in this chapter in isolation,
without any reference whatever to the discussions of the reservation
doctrine in two other chapters of the same volume. The reader who
would like to read everything in the treatise bearing on federal re-
served water rights has quite a chore ahead of him, for the index is
virtually worthless and there is no cross-referencing to this chapter
from other chapters, or vice versa. Perhaps an adequate index will be
forthcoming when the treatise is complete; in the meantime the reader
is left nearly helpless. The author of this essay, Mr. Edward Clyde, a
prominent practitioner in Salt Lake City, must share some of the
blame for the isolation of the chapter. Even if he did not see Professor
Morreale's chapter, he could have cited her article on the navigation
power, since it appeared in print four years before this volume was
published.
As we depart Volume Two, the quality of the treatise drops pre-
cipitously, with one notable exception. In Chapter 6, the last chapter
of Volume One, Professor Sato of the University of California at
Berkeley undertook the burdensome task of analyzing the tax aspects
of water development and use. He deals not only with federal income
tax questions but also with local property taxation of water rights and
irrigation works. The research on the latter questions was obviously
difficult, for a large number of jurisdictions is involved and no uni-
fying principle operates in the area. He nonetheless makes his chapter,
while not a positive joy to read, a well-integrated, well-written, and,
so far as I can tell, a well-thought-out piece of work.
The remaining essays in the collection range from mediocre to
plain bad. In the middling class is Volume Three, by Burton J.
Gindler, a Deputy Attorney General of California who specializes in
water law. The entire volume is devoted to pollution and is unfor-
givably padded. The last 118 of its 527 pages reproduce verbatim the
1909 Canadian Treaty and the 1944 Mexican Water Treaty, which
touch only incidentally on pollution, a couple of long federal statutes,
and some executive orders, regulations, and other administrative pub.
lications which do relate to pollution-all without the slightest com-
ment, note, or annotation. Publishers, editors, and authors who commit
this sin should be condemned to spend eternity reading their own filler
over and over. The padding aside, there is nothing terribly wrong
about the volume, but nothing especially right either. Much of the
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discussion of private remedies for water pollution is taken from the
Restatement of Torts, but little is added to that work other than trans-
lating it into passable English. The treatment of the state and federal
regulatory schemes is more original, and the author has had the good
sense to discuss not only the stick in the federal program but also the
carrot, which in my opinion is likely to have the greater effect.
The chief weakness of the pollution chapter is its failure to deal
with the excellent economic studies of water pollution control, exem-
plified by the works of Allan V. Kneese. In order to understand why
our waters have become so befouled the reader needs at least an intro-
duction to the economic concept of externalities, the disparity be-
tween private costs and social costs. In my view the limits on legal so-
lutions to water quality problems are likely to be set by economic
forces; feasible legal solutions will depend on viable economic solu-
tions. For this reason, the reader should be told about the modes of
measuring social costs and the techniques for forcing firms to absorb
these costs. Lastly, some thought should have been given to the sound-
ness of our present approaches to pollution control, whereby quanti-
tative standards of purity are set more or less arbitrarily, with enforce-
ment left to such traditional legal means as injunctions and fines. The
fact may be that some streams are more valuable for waste disposal
than for other purposes. An economist would say that if those using
the stream for waste disposal pay the cost of foregone alternative uses,
pollution of the stream may be the proper allocation of the resource.
Our present approach to pollution, while not positively forbidding
this course of conduct, certainly does not encourage it. I think it likely
that if we ignore economic forces, pollution control through legal
sanctions may be just one more "noble experiment," doomed to the
fate of the rest.
Turning back to Volume One, and excepting the contribution of
Professor Sato, we find a hodgepodge of very limited utility. Chapter
1, by the editor, Professor Clark, is labelled "Plan and Scope of the
Work," but would be more accurately styled "Random Thoughts on
Water, Water Institutions, and Other More or Less Germane Topics,"
with emphasis on "Random." In the 55 pages that form this Chapter, I
counted just eight references to other chapters of the work, and these
were general in nature, the internal evidence suggesting that they were
added after the chapter was in manuscript. In any event, no plan or
scope of the work is revealed in this chapter, and most of what it says
is incomplete, episodic, and covered elsewhere in the treatise at greater
length and depth.
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The purpose of Chapter 2 is similarly obscure. It affords an
overview of what might be called the property law of water, overlap-
ping with Chapter 1 in places and substantially identical in subject
matter to Chapter 4, the co-author of which was again Professor Clark.
Moreover, if the volumes promised for the future come along, they
will presumably treat the riparian, appropriation, and statutory permit
systems in depth and thus supersede both Chapters 2 and 4. The
author of Chapter 2, Mr. Wells A. Hutchins, favors the black-letter
approach, with the typical section a page or less in length. Thus Sec-
tion 16.5, entitled "Transfer or loss of riparian rights," contains nine
lines of text, three sentences, and citations to four cases, the latest of
which was decided in 1874. One might infer that transfer of riparian
rights is a pretty simple matter and that private ordering will work
nicely to reallocate water to higher uses. If the California experience
is any guide, this is far from correct, and a full treatment of the prob.
lem and its possible solutions is in order.
Section 18.3 fails to meet even the generally low standards of this
chapter. After referring to a thought-provoking exchange between an
economist and a law professor regarding the legal and institutional
obstacles to the transfer of appropriative rights,3 2 Mr. Hutchins de-
clares:
Whatever may be the effect of water doctrinal restraints on free
transfers of water rights in a given area, this fact stands out
dearly: the Fifth Amendment was added to the United States
Constitution at the beginning of our national history, and the
Fourteenth Amendment was added in 1868; therefore, every sub.
sequent statute, court decision, or acquired right of appropriation
carried with it this fundamental constitutional inhibition regard-
ing due process-an inhibition which applies to rights in land
and other property as well as in water.33
Period, end of section. This simply won't do.
Chapter 3, by Professor Albert W. Stone of Montana Law School,
deals primarily with boundaries, ownership of lake and river beds, ac-
cretion, reliction, and public access to water for recreation use. While
these are problems of considerable interest, I question their relevance
to a water law treatise. If the chapter had been well executed I suppose
I would not carp about relevance. But again, it covers ground covered
in Chapters 1, 2, 4, and 7. In addition, the organization is hard to fol-
32. 1 WATR RIGrrs § 18.3, at 83 n.85.
33. Id. § 18.3, at 83.
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low and the writing obscure. The author seems overwhelmed by his
material and as a result much of the discussion lacks focus.
Chapter 4, by Professor Clark and Mr. Clyde 0. Martz, now Assis-
tant Attorney General in charge of the Lands and Natural Resources
Division, reflects, on the other hand, the opposite defect: instead of
getting lost in their material, the authors slide along on top of it,
scarcely ever reaching plow depth. The basis for much of the chapter
is Volume Five of Powell on Real Property, which contains a brief,
admirable treatment of classes of water and water rights (the subject
matter of this chapter) and which did not need rewriting unless addi-
tions were to be made. An addition which might have been made but
wasn't would have been a careful analysis of Keys v. Romley,34 a recent
California case dealing with discharge of drainage water. The case is
important and deserves critical attention, especially with respect to its
impact on land development.
Though by no means the worst part of the work, Chapter 5, entitled
"Water Economics: Relations to Law and Policy," arouses my sharpest
disappointment. The author, Professor Ciriacy-Wantrup, a distin-
guished resources economist at the University of California, could
have provided significant help to water lawyers. Water allocation
problems that call for economic analysis are as plentiful as economic
learning among lawyers and judges is scarce. The problems vary from
the most general-how to design a new system for allocating water-
to the most particular-how to decide a controversy between a subse-
quent upstream manufacturer who uses the stream for cooling his
equipment and a prior downstream proprietor of an ice business that
suffers because the water temperature has risen. As an example of the
problems of designing a new allocation system, Iowa has by statute
limited permits to a maximum period of 10 years,3 renewable as a
matter of administrative discretion on standards not unduly carica-
tured as "the true, good, and beautiful." 3 Will investment be deterred
by this system? Nobody seems to know-or to care very much.37 An
economist should at least make us aware of the problem, and he might
34. 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1965).
35. IOWA CODE § 455A.20 (1962). The 1957 Iowa permit system, which radically over-
hauled the existing structure, is found in IowA CODE §§ 455A.1 et seq. (1962). For an en-
lightening study of the operation of the statute, see N. HiNEs, A DEC.AE OF Exvr auNcE
UNDER THE IOWA PER=" SYsmi (Agricultural Law Center, College of Lai, Uni . of Iom,
Monograph No. 9, 1966).
36. In haec verba: ".. . will not be detrimental to the public interests." IowA CODE
§ 455A.20 (1962). Actually, this is the standard for granting the initial permit, and I have
assumed it will apply to renewals. If not, there is no standard for reneval at all.
37. The generally excellent study by Hines, supra note 35, ignores this question.
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be able to provide some answers. Similarly (and perhaps understand-
ably, since the decision was in 1915) the court held for the prior user
in the case of the ice maker who found his river heated,88 ostensibly
because the defendant's use was unreasonable, but in reality, I suspect,
on the ground that plaintiff's ice business was there first. The result
may be good economics (although the granting of an injunction raises
serious questions); but if it is, the judges of that day did not know it,
and most lawyers and judges would not know it today. Again, it is ap-
palling to me that in 1967 a unanimous California Supreme Court
would allow a municipal dam builder to destroy a quarter-of-a-million
dollar business without one cent of compensation and without one
word about economics or resource allocation in its opinion.80 The
closest the court came to recognizing the resource allocation problem
was in this language:
Is it "reasonable" then, that the riches of our streams, which we
are charged with conserving in the great public interest, are to be
dissipated in the amassing of mere sand and gravel which for
aught that appears subserves no public policy?... We are satisfied
that in the instant case the use of such waters as an agent to expose
or to carry and deposit sand, gravel and rock, is as a matter of law
unreasonable .... 40
Summary judgment denying compensation.
Ideally, Professor Ciriacy-Wantrup would have reviewed the entire
treatise and provided an economic analysis where relevant. But more
modest than this, and extremely useful, would have been a chapter
discussing selected problems from the economist's viewpoint, with
suggestions to lawyers about how an economist's expertise could be
put to use in solving water allocation problems. As the chapter stands,
no references whatever are made to other chapters of the book, and no
concrete problems are subjected to economic analysis.
Instead, after finally working one's way through the dense, well-nigh
impenetrable prose of this chapter the brilliant shaft of light in the
clearing carries this illumination: "But in spite of-or possibly be-
cause of-differences in basic orientation, positive economics and law
have many complementary relations. To explore and to strengthen
these relations will benefit both social science disciplines." 41
38. Sandusky Portland Cement Co. v. Dixon Pure Ice Co., 221 F. 200 (7th Cir. 1915).
39. Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District, 67 A.C. 127, 429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. Rptr.
377 (1967).
40. Id. at 136, 429 P.2d at 895, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 383 (italics by the court).
41. 1 WATER RIGHTs § 63.5, at 450.
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Judged as a collection of essays, about half of the material in the
three volumes is worthwhile. Judged as a treatise--"a methodical dis-
cussion or exposition of the principles of the subject" 4-_-the work is a
failure, and a tragic failure at that. Three large opportunities were
squandered: there was (and is) a need for an up-to-date, comprehen-
sive, well-organized treatise on water law. There was (and is) a need to
demonstrate the relevance and utility of economics to natural resource
allocation by legal institutions. There was (and is) a need to show by
example that a multi-volume treatise written by a team of experts can
at once be more enlightening than, and just as coherent as, a single
author work. It is a pity that not one of these opportunities was
realized.
CHARLES J. MEYERSt
42. OxFoRD ENGxISH DIcONAY (1926).
t Professor of Law, Stanford University. A.B. Rice Institute, 1949; LL.B. University of
Texas, 1949; LL.M. Columbia, 1953.
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